ABSTRACT In recent years, mobile devices are becoming an integrated part of our society, and this reinforces the need for security and privacy without incurring additional communication and computation costs. In this paper, we propose a new efficient privacy preserving time-key-based single sign-on (TK-SSO) authenticated key management protocol for mobile devices using elliptic curve cryptography. This allows us to achieve the desirable security properties along with significantly reduced computation and communication costs. TK-SSO also supports the revocation of mobile users and servers. We prove the security of TK-SSO in a widely accepted adversary real-or-random model, as well as using Burrows-Abadi-Needham (BAN) logic and the Automated Validation of Internet Security Protocols and Applications (AVISPA) simulation tool to demonstrate that TK-SSO can resist various known attacks. We then evaluate the performance of TK-SSO and three related protocols to demonstrate its utility.
I. INTRODUCTION
With the popularity of mobile devices, such as Android and iOS devices, more traditional business transactions are being conducted online 24/7, regardless of their physical locations as long as they have Internet connections [1] - [4] . While this affords us many benefits, the openness nature of the wireless environment also exposes the users and system to a wide range of attacks [5] , [6] .
An example mobile cloud computing architecture is shown in Fig. 1 . In this architecture, the mobile devices can access cloud services in two manners: either through mobile network (telecom network) or through access points. A mobile user can use the mobile devices to access different services from different service providers via a wireless local area network (WLAN) or 3G/4G telecommunication networks, which may or may not be secure. The distributed locations of the service providers make it convenient for subscribers to access various resources. However, the design of distributed authentication protocol to ensure secure communication while providing low computational overheads for these mobile users is essential. In recent years, a large number of authentication protocols for single-server environment have been proposed [7] , [8] . To cater to the wide ranging and increasing demands for richer and interactive user services, more multi-server environments are deployed in practical applications. However, existing authentication protocols designed for single-server environment are not suited for such multi-server environment deployment because a user has to register in every single server and remembers all passwords for the many different servers. Single sign-on (SSO) authentication is a viable solution since it allows a user with a single credential to access multiple service providers; thus, this gives rise to multi-server authentication (MSA) protocol. In conventional SSO schemes, OpenID has been widely adopted by many Internet service providers such as Yahoo and Google, with over 50,000 websites reportedly using OpenID as their authentication scheme. In OpenID, threeparties are involved in the authentication process. In addition, the OpenID specifications strongly recommend the use of SSL network connection for all message transmissions. Since SSL technique is based on RSA public key cryptosystem, SSL implementation requires heavy computation costs. Such costs may not be realistic for deployment on a mobile device (e.g. when service-requests from mobile users are considered) [9] - [12] . The 256-bit elliptic curve cryptosystem (ECC) provides equivalent level of security as in a 3072-bit RSA public key [13] . Thus, ECC is more efficient for mobile users as compared to RSA.
The typical requirements of a multi-server authentication (MSA) protocol are user anonymity, session key (SK)-security, and mutual authentication. Recent literature have also suggested the need for revocation and re-registration features to be incorporated in MSA protocols due to the very real risk of a static authentication token being lost/compromised and subsequently used by an adversary to impersonate the user [18] , [28] . Although a number of MSA protocols have been proposed in the literature, most of these protocols do not support all the necessary security features. The design of a provably-secure and efficient MSA protocol supporting both revocation and un-traceability remains a research challenge [27] , [29] .
Existing MSA protocols can be broadly categorized into three-party based (Category 1; see [14] - [18] ), and two-party based (Category 2; see [22] - [28] ) -see Table 1 . In Category 1, a registration center, a server, and a user are involved in the authentication process, and protocols in Category 2 only consist of a server S and a user U in the authentication process. In Category 1, no MSA protocol with the exception of Odelu et al. [18] provides all necessary security features.
We also observe that the majority of the existing Category 2 MSA protocols fail to provide all necessary security features. This is the gap we seek to address in this paper, where we present an efficient privacy preserving time-key based single sign-on authenticated key management protocol (TK-SSO) for a multi-server environment supporting all necessary security features.
A. RELATED WORK
This section briefly reviews several multi-server authentication schemes proposed in the literature.
The design of MSA protocols has not been a smooth journey. For example, in 2013, Liao and Hsiao [23] proposed a pairing-based MSA protocol using self-certified public keys for mobile clients. However, in 2014, Hsieh and Leu [24] demonstrated that Liao and Hsiao's protocol [23] is susceptible to tracing attacks. In addition, it is pointed out that the protocol is inefficient as each service server has to update its ID table periodically. Hsieh and Leu [24] then presented an improved protocol, which distributes the static registration token with the dynamic secret token. We observe that the protocols of Liao and Hsiao [23] and Hsieh and Leu [24] use only temporary secret keys (ephemeral secrets) in their authentication messages and session key computation, which can be exploited to facilitate impersonation and ESL attacks (see [18] , [23] , [26] , [28] ).
Han and Zhu [25] proposed an ECC-based MSA protocol, which was subsequently shown to be vulnerable to the ESL attack [26] . Islam [26] then proposed an ESL attackfree MSA protocol using bilinear pairings. However, Islam's protocol [26] fails to ensure the privacy of user credentials as the identity is sent in plain text. We remark that majority of the protocols in Category 2 adopt a black/white list to revoke/permit users' access privileges, without addressing the issue of revoking a server's access privileges. To be able to revoke a server's access privileges, the system manager would need to notify each user and server [27] . In 2015, Tseng et al. [27] constructed a list-free MSA protocol using bilinear pairings. However, their protocol does not ensure the privacy of user credential since the user's identity is (again) sent in plain text. The protocol also distributes the static authentication tokens. In other words, Tseng et al.'s protocol does not support the basic security features previously discussed.
In this paper, we aim to design a novel list-free MSA protocol using ECC, which offers all well known security functionalities. The functionalities of various existing multiserver authentication protocols are summarized in Table 1 .
B. CONTRIBUTION AND PAPER ORGANIZATION
The key contribution in this paper is the proposed privacy preserving time-key based single sign-on authenticated key management protocol (TK-SSO) for a multi-server environment deployment. The characteristics of the proposed protocol are as follow:
• A session key is shared between a mobile user and a server in the multi-server environment, and no other parties including the registration center will learn the session key in the proposed scheme.
• User credentials' privacy is guaranteed in the proposed scheme even if the temporary information involved in the session is leaked. This feature does not exist in most of the existing multi-server schemes.
• Session key security (SK-security) is provided in the proposed scheme. The proposed scheme has the ability to withstand ephemeral secret leakage (ESL) attack and provides forward secrecy.
• Revocation property is supported in the proposed scheme, which allows one to revoke misbehaving or compromised users and servers from the system prior to their expiration dates.
• Revocation and re-registration properties using the same identity due to distribution of dynamic initial private keys are supported in the proposed scheme.
• User identity information is stored by the RC to prevent many logged-in users attacks as well as impersonation attacks. The remainder of the paper is as follows. In Section II, we discuss the required preliminaries. In Section III, we present the proposed TK-SSO protocol. We prove the security of TK-SSO in Section IV, as well as using AVISPA tool in Section V. In Section VI, we evaluate the performance of TK-SSO with related protocols in the literature. Section VII concludes the paper.
II. MATHEMATICAL PRELIMINARIES
We will now briefly review relevant mathematical preliminaries used in the paper.
A. ELLIPTIC CURVE OVER PRIME FIELD GF (p)
Let p be a large prime number. A non-singular elliptic curve E p (a, b) over the Galois field GF(p) is defined by the equation y 2 = x 3 + ax + b, where a, b ∈ Z p and 4a 3 + 27b 2 = 0 (mod p). All points on E p (a, b) and a special point O called the point at infinity form an additive group G. More precisely, a well-known Hasse's theorem asserts that the number of points on E p (a, b), which is denoted by #E, satisfies the following inequality:
In other words, an elliptic curve E p (a, b) over Z p has roughly p points on it.
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If P = (x P , y P ) and Q = (x Q , y Q ) be two points in E p (a, b), then the addition of P and Q is given by R = (x R , y R ) = P+Q and it is computed by the following rule:
Let P be a generator of G, the ECC point multiplication or scalar multiplication kP is defined by the equation
It is well known that the below mathematical problems are computationally infeasible (hard).
Definition 1 (Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem (ECDLP)): Given a point Q ∈ G, it is hard to compute the discrete logarithm k such that Q = kP.
Definition 2 (Elliptic Curve Computational Diffie-Hellman Problem (ECCDHP)): Given two points xP, yP ∈ G for unknown x, y ∈ Z p , it is hard to compute xyP ∈ G.
Definition 3 (Elliptic Curve Decisional Diffie-Hellman Problem (ECDDHP)): Given three points xP, yP, zP ∈ G for unknown x, y, z ∈ Z p , it is hard to decide whether xyP = zP, where x, y, z ∈ Z * p .
B. SYSTEM OF LINEAR EQUATIONS (SLE)
Let c i = a i y + b i z be a system of l linear equations (l-SLE) in y and z, where a i = a j and b i = b j if and only if i = j, for i = 1, 2, · · · , l. We define the following three cases [30] , [31] :
• Case 1. If both a i and b i are known, the equations form a system of l linear equations with two unknowns y and z. The system is solvable for y and z, and it has a unique solution.
• Case 2. If a i (or b i ) is unknown, the equations form a system of l equations with l + 2 unknowns a i (or b i ), y and z. The system is also solvable, however it has infinitely many solutions.
• Case 3. If both a i and b i are unknown, the equations form a system of l equations with 2l +2 unknowns a i , b i , y and z. The system is still solvable, however it has infinitely many solutions. Solving an l-SLE with l +m unknowns, m > 0, for the correct unique solution is same as guessing randomly the m correct numbers. Thus, solving l-SLE with more than l unknowns for the correct unique solution (in short, SLEUS) is assumed to be computationally hard problem.
III. THE PROPOSED PROTOCOL
In this section, we give the details of TK-SSO for lightweight mobile devices in mobile cloud computing environment using ECC. In the proposed protocol, the RC (registration center) is the responsible for generating and distributing private keys of mobile users and cloud servers. The mobile user devices are assumed to be lightweight devices such as laptops and mobile phones, and these request for the services from powerful server. After mutual authentication, the cloud server and mobile user agree on a secure session key to communicate each other securely in future. Note that the RC does not involve in the authentication process of the proposed protocol. The notations and their meanings are listed in Table 2 . We use these notations throughout this paper.
In TK-SSO, we adopt the similar approach for the revocation of users and servers as presented in the protocols [18] , [27] . The private key consists of two parts, namely, the dynamic initial key and time update key. In TK-SSO, the initial key will be update only in the genuine case when the initial key is unexpectedly revealed, whereas most of the existing protocols distributed the static keys including Tseng et al.'s protocol [27] . On the other hand, the time update key is renewed periodically by the RC in the defined intervals, called the lifetime of the time update key. Thus, TK-SSO provides list-free authentication with revocation facility for the users as well as servers. In addition, our proposed TK-SSO provides user credentials' privacy and resists ESL attack. The proposed TK-SSO consists of the following four phases, namely, system initialization phase, registration phase, time key update phase, and authentication and key establishment phase, which are described as follows.
A. SYSTEM INITIALIZATION PHASE
In TK-SSO, the RC selects a non-singular elliptic curve E p (a, b) and a base point P on E p (a, b) which is of order 160 bits prime q in a finite field GF(p), where p is a sufficiently large prime number so that ECDLP becomes intractable. Let G = {p, E p (a, b), P} be an elliptic curve group generated by P. Further, the RC chooses two cryptographic collision-resistant one-way hash functions H u , H s : {0, 1} * → Z * p , and symmetric-key cryptosystem . Both hash functions H u (·) and H s (·) are used in the subsequent sections and the purpose of using these hash functions are explained in those sections. Finally, the RC randomly chooses a random number k as its master private key, computes the corresponding public key Q = kP, and then publicly declares 
B. REGISTRATION PHASE
The registration process of the servers and the users for our proposed TK-SSO is discussed in the following subsections and also summarized in Table 3 .
1) SERVER REGISTRATION PHASE
A server S j selects its unique identity ID j and sends it to the RC via a secure channel. When receiving the identity, RC randomly chooses a number r j and computes the initial private
∈ {−1, 0, 1} in its identity table, where the status of S j is inactive if status = 0, active if status = 1, and inactive and misbehavior/compromised if status = −1. Finally, RC sends the message d j to S j securely, and then S j keeps received initial private key d j as secret for long-term use.
2) USER REGISTRATION PHASE
A user U i selects its unique identity ID i and sends it to RC via a secure channel. When receiving the request, RC randomly chooses a number r i and computes the initial private Remark 1 (Initial key update): Suppose a server S j (or a user U i ) wants to change its initial private key for some security reasons without changing the identity ID j (or ID i ), respectively. In this case, the server S j (or user U i ) first needs to revoke its account, and then to send the re-registration request with the same identity to the RC. Upon receiving the re-registration request, the RC verifies the personal identity of S j (or U i ), and then checks whether it is registered with the status as inactive. The RC then chooses a fresh random number r fresh j
(or r fresh i
) and issues the fresh initial private key
Finally, the RC updates r j (or r i ) with the corresponding r fresh j (or r fresh i ) in its identity table. In this way, the re-registration can be easily performed in the proposed scheme.
C. TIME KEY UPDATE PHASE
The time update keys of the servers and users are periodically updated by RC according to the defined security requirements. The detailed process is explained in the following subsections. The time key update phase is also summarized in Table 3 .
1) SERVER TIME KEY UPDATE
RC chooses a random number q j , and computes Q j = q j P and
, where LT j is the lifetime of Q j . RC sends the time update key {s j , Q j , LT j } to S j via a public channel. Upon
If it holds, S j keeps the secret d j in its lifetime. Finally, S j publicly declares {ID j , s j , Q j , LT j } to provide services to valid users.
2) USER TIME KEY UPDATE
RC chooses a random number q i , and computes the temporary identity Remark 2: Note that to revoke a server S j (or user U i ), RC simply stops issuing the time update keys and sets status = 0 for self revoking server (or user), and sets status = −1 for the misbehavior/compromised revoking server (or user) in their corresponding identity table entry. As a result, the revocation property is satisfied in our proposed scheme. In the above time key update phases, the keys are generated using the ECC-based ElGammal-type digital signature [30] , [31] . Thus, the hardness of time key forgery remains same as that for the ECDLP assumption.
D. AUTHENTICATION AND KEY ESTABLISHMENT PHASE
In this phase, a secure session key a user U i and a server S j is established after mutual authentication. It has the following steps: Step 1. U i chooses a random number x u , and computes
where R u .x represents the x-coordinate of the ECC point R u . Note that R u .x is 160 bits in size, and if we want to use the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) symmetric encryption algorithm, we need to use only 128 bits from 160 bits of R u .x. Finally, U i sends the request message M 1 = AID i , X u to S j via a public channel.
Step 2. After receiving 
Step 3. Upon receiving M 2 , U i computes the session key
s )P, and checks whether the condition h s = H s (SK u , X s , X u , TID i , R u ) holds or not. If it holds, U i authenticates S j and confirms that S j is agreed on the shared session key is SK = SK u .
, and sends the confirmation message M 3 = h u to S j via a public channel.
Step 4. After receiving M 3 , S j checks whether the condition h u = H u (SK s , X u , X s , Q i , R s ) holds or not. If it holds, S j authenticates U i and confirms that the shared session key is SK = SK s = SK u . Otherwise, S j terminates the session.
The authentication and key establishment phase is summarized in Table 4 .
IV. SECURITY ANALYSIS
In this section, as in [18] we first show that TK-SSO can provide the session-key security in the random oracle model and then prove that TK-SSO provides mutual authentication using the widely-accepted BAN logic [32] . We then show that TK-SSO is also secure against various common attacks.
The BAN logic based proof only captures the mutual authentication between two communicating entities. The random oracle model using the Real-Or-Random (ROR) model proves the semantic security of the proposed scheme for the session key (SK) security against an adversary for deriving the session key between a user U i and a server S j . The formal security verification using the widely-accepted AVISPA tool [18] , [33] ensures that the proposed scheme is secure against the replay and man-in-the-middle attacks. Since the security analysis using ROR model and BAN logic do not capture all the attacks, we require the security analysis using AVISPA tool as well as informal (non-mathematical) security analysis.
A. ADVERSARY MODEL
Based on the Real-Or-Random (ROR) model [34] , [35] , we give the formal security analysis of the proposed protocol. In our proposed protocol, three parties are the user U i , server S j and registration center RC. A brief review of ROR model is presented as follows.
Participants. is said to be fresh, if the session key SK shared between U i and S j is not leaked to A.
Adversary. In this model, an adversary A will have full control over the communication channel, and have access to the following queries:
• Execute( t , u ) : Through this query, A can get messages exchanged between U i and S j . This query models a passive attack.
• Send( t , m) : Through this query, A gets a response message after sending the message m. This query models an active attack.
• Test( t ) : It models the semantic security of the session key based on the indistinguishability in the ROR model [34] . A coin c is flipped at the beginning. If c = 1, the session key is sent to A; otherwise (c = 0), a random number is sent to A.
Semantic security of the session key. In the ROR model, A is challenged in an experiment to distinguish the real session key and the random number. A can only make one Test query and the response of Test query is consistent with the coin c. At last, A outputs his/her guess c about c. We say A wins the game if c = c. The advantage that A can violate semantic security of the authenticated key agreement (AKE) protocol P is defined by the equation Adv AKE P = |2.Pr[Succ]−1|, where Succ denotes the event that A can win the game. P is said to be a secure multi-server authentication protocol in ROR sense if Adv AKE P ≤ δ, where δ > 0 is a sufficiently small number.
Random oracle. As defined in Chang and Le [35] , all the participants and the adversary A are provided with a collision-resistant one-way hash function H (·)
B. FORMAL SECURITY ANALYSIS USING ROR MODEL
For the formal security analysis, we utilize the difference lemma [36] , [37] as follows.
Lemma 1 (Difference Lemma): Let P, Q and R denote the events defined in some probability distribution. Let P ∧ ¬R ⇔ Q ∧ ¬R. Then,
Using the ROR model discussed in Section IV-A and Lemma 1, in following Theorem 1 we prove that the proposed authentication scheme is secure and provides the SK-security.
Theorem 1: Suppose A is an adversary running in polynomial time t against our proposed scheme P in the random oracle. Then, the probability that A breaks the SK-security of P is given by
where q h , |Hash| and Adv ECDDHP G q (t) denote the number of Hash queries made to the oracle, the output range of the hash function and the advantage of A in breaking the ECDDHP, respectively.
Proof: It consists of a sequence of four defined games G i , for i = 0, 1, 2, 3. Suppose E i is an event wherein the adversary A succeeds in guessing the bit c in game G i and wins the game. We start with real attack game G 0 against our proposed scheme P and then end with game G 3 which concludes that the advantage to break SK-security of P is negligible.
Game G 0 : This game simulates the real attack by A against our protocol P. Since the bit c needs to be chosen at the beginning of G 0 , by definition, we have
(1) 
Game
Note that d i and x u are secret to U i , and d j and x s are also secret to S j . Therefore, without these information. eavesdropping does not increase the probability of winning the game for the adversary A. Then, G 0 is equivalent to G 1 , and thus we have,
Game 
Game G 3 : This game models an attack wherein A has to compute the real session key SK (= SK u = SK s ) using 
Since all the session keys are random and independent, and no information about the value of c is revealed to the adversary A, we have
We solve Equations (1) - (5) and use Lemma 1 to obtain the following result. Equation (1) yields
Using the triangular inequality, we get,
With the help of Equations (2) and (5), we have,
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From Equations (6) and (8), we obtain,
Finally, Equations (6) and (9) give the final result:
C. AUTHENTICATION PROOF BASED ON BAN LOGIC
The notations used in the BAN logic are given below [32] . P and Q are the principles, X and Y are the formulas, and Z is a statement.
• P |≡ Z : P believes Z .
• #(X ) : X assumed to be fresh.
• P ⇒ Z : P has jurisdiction over Z .
• P Z : P sees the statement Z .
• P |∼ Z : P once said the statement Z .
• (X , Y ) : The statement X or Y is a part of the formula (X , Y ).
• {W } K : W is encrypted using the symmetric-key K .
• X Y : The X is combined with shared secret Y .
• P K ←→ Q : K is the shared secret between P and Q, never discover to third party.
• P X Q : The secret X is only known to P and Q, and possibly the trusted third party by them. Rules: We use the following four BAN logic rules in our proof:
• R1. Message-meaning rule:
• R2. Nonce-verification rule:
• R3. Jurisdiction rule:
• R4. Freshness-conjuncatenation rule:
P|≡#(X ,Y ) . Goals: We prove that the proposed scheme satisfies the following test goals that prove the proposed authentication scheme provides secure mutual authentication:
Since the information {s j , ID j , Q j , LT j } are the valid public key information of the server S j within the lifetime LT i , the key R = R u = R s is a shared key between the user U i and the server S j , where
Thus, without any loss of generality, we assume that the key R = R s is shared key between user U i and server S j in that instance. Generic form: The generic form of the communicated messages.
• From message M 1 :
• From message M 2 :
• From message M 3 :
The idealized form of the communicated messages.
•
Hypotheses:
The proof using the BAN logic rules and assumptions is as follows.
• From message M 1 , we have
• From H 4 , S 1 and R1, we obtain S 2 :
• From message M 2 , we have
• From H 3 , S 3 and R1, we get S 4 :
• From H 1 , S 4 , R2 and R4, we obtain S 5 :
• Again, from H 5 , S 5 and R3, we get S 6 :
• From H 4 , S 7 and R1, we get S 8 :
• From H 2 , S 8 , R2 and R4, we obtain S 9 :
• From H 6 , S 9 and R3, we finally obtain
From the goals G 1 -G 4 , it is proved that our proposed TK-SSO provides secure mutual authentication, and thus, the proposed protocol also prevents the man-in-the-middle attack as well as reply attack.
D. OTHER POSSIBLE ATTACKS
This section shows that our TK-SSO resists various possible well known attacks.
1) COLLABORATIVE AND KEY RECOVERY ATTACKS
In this attack, a group of users U u i , u = 1, 2, · · · , n, and servers S v j , v = 1, 2, · · · , m, collaborate and try to derive the system private key k using the initial private keys and time update keys. The initial private key of a user U u i is computed as Thus, these equations form a system of n+m linear equations with n+m+1 unknowns k, a u i and a v j 's. From Section II-B (SLE), this system is solvable and have many solutions in Z q . This implies that computing the unique correct solution for the above SLE is same as the random guessing of the system private key k. In addition, due to the difficulty of solving ECDLP (ElGammal type signature), it is also computationally infeasible for the adversary to generate the valid time update keys {s i , TID i , Q i , LT i } of a user and {s j , Q j , LT j } of a server without the knowledge of the system private key k. As a result, our proposed TK-SSO is secure against collaborative and key recovery attacks.
2) USER ANONYMITY
In the proposed TK-SSO, a legal user
In order to compute R u (= R s ), A needs either the pair (d i , x u ) or the secret key d j of S j . Due to the difficulty of solving ECDLP, even if A knows the temporary secret x u , it is infeasible to compute the information (s i , TID i , Q i , LT i ), without the knowledge of either d i or d j . Moreover, the original ID i does not revealed to S j , instead U i shares a temporary identity TID i with S j , which is only valid in the lifetime LT i . As a result, the proposed TK-SSO provides the user anonymity.
3) SECURE MUTUAL AUTHENTICATION
From Section IV-C, it is clear from BAN logic test goals G 1 -G 4 that our proposed scheme provides secure mutual authentication between U i and S j . In addition, it also confirm the secure shared session key between U i and S j . This implies that the proposed TK-SSO also resists the replay and man-inthe-middle attacks.
4) SK-SECURITY
In our proposed TK-SSO, the session key SK is computed as
Thus, computing SK requires any one of the pairs (d i , x u ) and (d j , x s ) by an adversary A. Except these two pairs, it is a computationally hard for A to derive the session key SK . As a result, even if the session-specific temporary information or initial private keys are revealed, except the two pairs (d i , x u ) and (d j , x s ), the adversary A has no ability to derive the session key due to the difficulty of solving ECDLP. Therefore, the proposed TK-SSO provides the SK-security, that is, TK-SSO resists ESL attack and also provides perfect forward secrecy.
5) SERVER SPOOFING ATTACK
To impersonate a server S j to a user U i , an adversary A needs to guess the valid challenge x s ) is computationally hard for the adversary A due to the difficulty of solving ECDLP. As a result, the proposed TK-SSO successfully prevents the server spoofing attack.
6) IMPERSONATION ATTACK
An adversary A does not have any means to get a user U i 's information in order to be authenticated by the server S j to establish a session key. Moreover, S j and U i mutually authenticate each other. Thus, the attacker has no ability to derive the valid user authentication factor d i (or the initial key d i ) due to the difficulty of solving ECDLP. As a result, our proposed TK-SSO has the ability to prevent the impersonation attack.
V. SIMULATION FOR FORMAL SECURITY VERIFICATION USING AVISPA TOOL
We apply the widely-accepted AVISPA tool [18] , [33] to simulate the proposed protocol and analyze its security functions. The AVISPA tool checks whether a security protocol is secure against replay and man-in-the-middle attacks.
AVISPA tool has been widely used in the design of security protocols because it can be used to check whether security protocols are safe or unsafe against passive and active adversaries [33] . The designed protocol models are written in the High Level Protocol Specification Language (HLPSL) [39] . AVISPA tool is used for the automated validation of Internet security-sensitive protocols and applications consisting of the four backends: (i) On-the-fly-Model-Checker (OFMC), (ii) Constraint Logic based Attack Searcher (CL-AtSe), (iii) SAT-based Model-Checker (SATMC) and (iv) Tree Automata based on Automatic Approximations for the Analysis of Security Protocols (TA4SP) The details of AVISPA tool and HLPSL specification are provided in [33] and [39] .
A. HLPSL SPECIFICATION
The HLPSL implementation of the proposed scheme is done for the basic roles: user for user U i , server for server S j and rc for the RC. Apart from these basic roles, we have two compulsory roles: session for the session and environment for the goal and environment.
In Fig. 2 , we have specified the role of the user U i . During the user registration process, U i first receives the start signal, and sends the registration request to the RC securely and then updates its state from 0 to 2, where the state is maintained by the variable State. After that U i receives d i securely from the RC and also updates its state from 2 to 4. During the user time key update phase, U i receives {s i , TID i , Q i , LT i } from the RC via open channel and the state is changed from 4 to 6. During information ID j is only known to S j and the RC which is characterized by the protocol id s1. We have also declared the secret credentials by the secret declaration. In a similar way, the roles for S j and the RC in HLPSL specification are implemented and shown in Fig. 3 and 4 , respectively. Finally, we have provided the specifications in HLPSL for the roles of session, and goal and environment in Fig. 6 and 7 , respectively. In the session goal, all the basic roles: user, server and rc are instanced with concrete arguments. The toplevel role, known as environment, defines in the specification of HLPSL that contains the global constants and a composition of one or more sessions. It is worth noticing that the intruder (always indicated by the variable i) also plays some roles as legitimate users. Hence, i also takes participation in the execution of the protocol as a concrete session.
B. ANALYSIS OF SIMULATION RESULTS
We have simulated our proposed TK-SSO using the widelyaccepted OFMC and CL-AtSe backends [40] for the formal security verification under the SPAN (Security Protocol ANimator for AVISPA) [41] . The simulation results are reported in Fig. 5 . For the formal security verification, we have chosen the widely-accepted back-ends: OFMC and CL-AtSe for the execution tests and a bounded number of sessions model checking. The following verifications are performed in our implementation:
• Replay attack check: In HLPSL, the OFMC and CL-AtSe back-ends check whether the legitimate agents can execute the specified protocol by performing a search of a passive intruder. The backends provide the intruder the knowledge of some normal sessions between the legitimate agents. The test results shown in Fig. 5 clearly shows that our scheme is secure against the replay attack.
• Dolev-Yao model check: For the Dolev-Yao model check, OFMC and CL-AtSe backends verifies if there is any man-in-the-middle attack possible by the intruder in the system. Under the OFMC backend, the depth for the search is 12, where 3344 nodes have been searched in 15.21 seconds and output of the results are shown in Fig. 5 . Under the CL-AtSe backend, 5 states were analyzed, where one state was reachable. The translation took 0.23 seconds and the computation required 0.01 seconds. It is evident from the reported results that our scheme fulfills the design properties, and our scheme is secure under the test of AVISPA using OFMC and CL-AtSe backends with the bounded number of sessions.
From the results, it is evident that our scheme is secure against replay and man-in-the-middle attacks.
VI. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this section, we evaluate the performance of our scheme with Han and Zhu's scheme [25] , Islam's scheme [26] and Tseng et al.'s scheme [27] .
The following notations are used in the evaluation:
• T e : time to execute a bilinear map.
• T m : time to execute a point multiplication in a bilinear pairing group.
• T h : time to execute a map-to-point hash function in a bilinear pairing group.
• T ecm : time to execute a point multiplication in an elliptic curve group. VOLUME 5, 2017 FIGURE 6. The role specification for session.
FIGURE 7.
The role specification for goal and environment.
• T add : time to execute a point addition in an elliptic curve group or bilinear pairing group.
• T H : time to execute a one-way hash function.
• T : time to execute a symmetric key encryption/decryption operation.
Similar to the approaches in [25] , [27] , and [42] , we use the following security parameters to achieve the 1024-bit level security. For pairing based protocols, we use a supper singular or non-supper singular curve over a finite field GF(p), with p a prime of 512 bits, and a large prime order of q = 160 bits. On the other hand, for ECC-based protocols, we use the ECC group on the Koblitz elliptic curve y 2 = x 3 + ax + b defined over GF (2 163 ), where a = 1 and b is an 163-bit random prime. In addition, we assume the approximate execution timings for the various related cryptographic operations for a user and a server implemented separately on the Philips HiPersmart card and the Pentium IV computer with the maximum clock speeds of 36MHz and 3GHz, respectively (see Table 5 , also reported in [42] ). We use the execution timings according to the various cryptographic operations listed in Table 5 in order to evaluate the performance of the protocols.
The computational cost and the approximate protocol execution timings during the authentication and key establishment phase are listed in Table 6 . For simplicity, we assume that the execution time of the symmetric-key encryption/decryption is approximately equal to the execution time required for one-way hash function, i.e. T ≈ T H . In the proposed TK-SSO, the computational cost required for a user U i is 4T ecm + T add + 4T H + T operations and a server S j is 4T ecm + T add + 4T H + T operations. Furthermore, in our proposed TK-SSO, the approximate protocol execution timings for a user U i and a server S j are 0.251s and 2.35ms, respectively. It is observed that the proposed TK-SSO significantly reduces the computation costs in both authentication and key establishment phases.
In Table 7 , the bandwidth requirements in the protocols in both authentication and key establishment phases are evaluated. In order to estimate the approximate communication cost (total bandwidth) to establish a secure session, we assume the following bit lengths (following to the approach in [25] ). The bit lengths of an identity, life-time, symmetric-key plaintext/ciphertext block, and one-way hash function are 16 bits, 32 bits, 128 bits (for example, if we use AES-128) and 160 bits, respectively. The bit length of a point on a pairing curve is 2 × 512 = 1024 bits, whereas an ECC point requires 2 × 163 = 326 bits. The communication bandwidth required in the proposed TK-SSO is computed as follows: the message M 1 = AID i , X u needs approximately (160 + 128 + 326 + 32)/128 × 128 + 326 = 768 bits and the message M 2 = X s , h s requires 326 + 160 = 486 bits, whereas the message M 3 = h u needs 160 bits. From Table 6 , it is observed that the total bandwidth required in the proposed TK-SSO is approximately 1414 bits, whereas the bandwidth requirements in Han-Zhu's scheme, Islam 
VII. CONCLUSION
Single Sign-on authentication is an active research topic in distributed computing, partly due to the ongoing developments in wireless networks and mobile cloud computing. In such environment, users need to access the remote servers for various services using lightweight devices (e.g. Android and iOS devices).
In this paper, we proposed a novel ECC-based revocable privacy preserving protocol for lightweight mobile devices in the mobile cloud computing environment, TK-SSO. We also pointed out that majority of the existing schemes do not provide the necessary security features required in a multiserver deployment, while TK-SSO is designed to support these features. For example, we demonstrated that TK-SSO supports revocation which allows one to revoke misbehaving or compromised users or servers from the system prior to their expiration dates. We also proved the security of TK-SSO mathematically and using BAN logic, and evaluated the performance of the proposal against existing related protocols. The evaluations showed that both computation and communication costs in TK-SSO are significantly less that those in the related schemes. 
